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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this case and appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102. 
NOTICE OF RELATED AND COMPANION APPEAL 
The Appellant Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. ("D. Gilbert") respectfully notifies and asks 
this Court to take Judicial Notice under Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence that 
there is pending before this Court a related and companion appeal styled: In the Matter of 
the Discipline of Donald D. Gilbert, Jr., SBN 6733, Respondent, Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Appellee v. Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc., a Utah not for profit 
corporation, Appellant and Third-Party Defendant, Appellate No. 20110004-SC. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1. Whether the District Courts' June 13, 2008 Order and Judgment of 
Disgorgement of Funds and January 14, 2011 Minute Entry Order reaffirming the July 
13, 2008 Order are void as a matter of law because the district courts lacked in personam 
jurisdiction over D. Gilbert who was never named as a defendant or served personally 
with a summons and complaint in the action as required under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and applicable case law. 
Preservation of Issue No. 1 in the Trial Court and Standard of Review. Issue No. 
1 was properly raised before and preserved in the trial courts. (R. 1299-1303). The 
district court's denial of D. Gilbert's Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate the Court's January 14, 
2011 Order denying D. Gilbert's Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate, Expunge and Set Aside 
an Order and Judgment is reviewed for legal and constitutional correctness. The 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellate Court in this appeal is not required to defer to the discretion of the district court 
under the abuse of discretion standard when in personam jurisdiction is properly raised 
below. The trial courts' orders are reviewed for legal correctness. Jackson Construction 
Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Utah 2004); State Dep't. ofSoc. Servs. v. Vigil, 
784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 N.4 (Utah 1986). 
Issue No. 2. Whether the District Courts' entry of the June 13, 2008 Order and 
Judgment of Disgorgement of Funds against D. Gilbert and the January 14, 2011 Minute 
Entry Order Denying D. Gilbert's Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate, Expunge and Set 
Aside the June 13 Order violated D. Gilbert's Utah State and United States Constitutional 
Procedural Due Process Rights that he be properly informed and served with legal 
process of a pending legal action against him and provided an opportunity to defend 
himself against the action. 
Preservation of Issue No. 2 in the Trial Court and Standard of Review. Issue No. 
2 was properly raised before and preserved in the trial courts. (R. 1299-1303). The 
court's denial of D. Gilbert's Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate the District Court's January 
14, 2011 Order denying D. Gilbert's Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate, Expunge and Set 
Aside an Order and Judgment is reviewed for legal and constitutional correctness. The 
Appellate Court in this appeal is not required to defer to the discretion of the district court 
under the abuse of discretion standard when in personam jurisdiction is properly raised 
below. The trial courts' orders are reviewed for legal correctness. Jackson Constr., 100 
P.3d at 1214; Vigil, 784 P.2d at 1132; Garcia, 712 P.2d at 290 N.4. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND APPLICABLE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
ISSUE NO. 1 - DETERMATIVE LAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Relief from Judgment or Order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: 
(4) the judgment is void; 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, § 1 (Due Process Clause); and 
Utah State Constitution, Art. I, § 7 (Due Process Clause). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by plaintiff 
or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b)(i) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons 
together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the 
filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause 
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be 
dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own 
initiative. 
(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and 
(c) Contents of summons. 
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, 
the names of the parties of the action, and the county in which it is brought. It shall be 
directed to the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs 
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state 
the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be 
rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the 
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of service. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ISSUE NO. 2 - DETERMATIVE LAW 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, § 1 (Due Process Clause); and 
Utah State Constitution, Art. I, § 7 (Due Process Clause). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings. This is an appeal from a final Order entered as a 
Minute Entry on January 14, 2011 by the Honorable Judge Paul G. Maughan, reaffirming 
the June 13, 2008 Order and Judgment of Disgorgement of Attorney Fees entered by the 
Honorable Judge Robert Faust against D. Gilbert and denying D. Gilbert's motion to 
vacate and expunge or set aside an order and judgment entered against him by Judge 
Faust's June 13, 2008 Minute Entry Order, this latter order is also appealed here. The 
June 13, 2008 and January 14, 2011 Minute Entry and Orders were entered in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Course of Proceedings. This action was originally commenced by the Utah Down 
Syndrome Foundation, a Utah not for profit corporation ("UDSF") by filing a complaint 
on February 5, 2007 in the district court. (R. 1-11). The complaint named as defendants 
Utah Down Syndrome Association, Eric Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam Holman, Jill 
Austin, Lisa Kingsbury, Kara Olander, and Mellanie Taylor. (R. 2). The complaint 
asserted several claims, including: (1) an accounting; (2) conversion; (3) 
misappropriation of confidential/proprietary information; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) 
an injunction for unauthorized and deceptive use of the names "Utah Down Syndrome 
Foundation", "Up With Downs", and "Uptown Downs" or similar names; and (6) 
injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from using UDSF's mailing lists, business materials 
4 
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and any related UDSF proprietary forms and materials. (R. 1-11). The defendants were 
originally represented by legal counsel, Mr. Graham H. Norris only. (R. 12). D. Gilbert, 
at all relevant times, has been and is a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar 
("USB No. 6733"). D. Gilbert is not and has never been a party to this action. 
Mr. Norris withdrew as counsel for the defendants on June 14, 2007. (R. 55-56). 
D. Gilbert entered an appearance of counsel of record for certain Interveners in this 
action, the members of Uptown Downs ("Uptown") and Up With Downs ("Up") on July 
13, 2007. (R. ). Various motions were filed involving disputes between the various 
parties that included claims to certain funds Uptown and Up had in the bank account and 
that they had paid to D. Gilbert for legal services rendered. (R. 150-196: 835-850; 956-
965). Later, during the course of these proceedings in the district court, this ended the 
case (R. 1312-14) and certain individual defendant members of Uptown and Up were 
dismissed as parties. (R. 919, 1115-19; 1173-80). 
UDSF filed a motion in this case claiming the monies paid by Uptown and Up to 
D. Gilbert for attorney fees were their funds and sought an order against D. Gilbert (not a 
party) for disgorgement of the funds. (R. 835-850). Another concurrent motion also 
sought the same relief against Uptown and Up claiming these entities were fictitious 
business names of UDSF. (R. 150-156). 
D. Gilbert did not respond individually to the disgorgement motion but did for 
Uptown and Up. Throughout the filing of these motions seeking disgorgement of 
attorney fees from D. Gilbert and the lower courts' hearings on these motions, D. Gilbert 
had never been named as a party nor served process pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Civil Procedure. The Court, Judge Robert Faust presiding, entered an Order of 
Disgorgement against seven individuals in an open court proceeding held on March 10, 
2008 and directed D. Gilbert should disgorge the funds. (R. 1336; Tr. at 76). Judge 
Faust further ordered during the March 2008 hearing that if D. Gilbert did not disgorge 
the funds, then his individual clients must make the necessary disgorgement. (R. 1336; 
Tr. at 86). At no time during these March 10, 2008 proceedings before Judge Faust, did 
his Honor ever address or consider the fundamental constitutional principals of in 
personam jurisdiction. That is, the Court did not address the glaring and undisputed 
procedural facts that D. Gilbert had not been served Rule 4 process nor named as a party 
defendant at any time in the case while it was pending before Judge Faust. Although the 
Court did suggest the possibility of entering a contempt order against D. Gilbert during 
this hearing, the court chose to give Mr. Gilbert a "free pass". (R. 1336; Tr. at 54, 89). 
The Court's March 2008 bench hearing rulings against the defendants and D. Gilbert 
were followed-up by a March 11, 2008 Minute Entry. (R. 907-911). 
Following the Court's hearing in March 2008, Mr. Gilbert was terminated by his 
clients and withdrew on April 14, 2008, (R. 920-21) UDSF's counsel then submitted a 
proposed order on June 12, 2008 based in part upon Judge Faust's March 2008 oral 
argument and hearing comments and order, without providing a copy to D. Gilbert. (R. 
1078-81). Thus, denying D. Gilbert the most basic procedural rights of an opportunity to 
review and, if necessary, oppose the proposed order as required under Rule 7(f)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which order included a judgment against D. Gilbert that 
he must disgorge the funds. This order was entered by the Court on June 13, 2009 
6 
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without any consideration by Judge Faust of D. Gilbert's various due process rights. (R. 
1078-81; 1127-29). D. Gilbert in November 2010 filed a motion to vacate the June 2009 
judgment and expunge it from the record based on in personam jurisdictional grounds. 
(R. 1187-90). This motion was assigned to Judge Paul Maughan in the Third District 
Court. (R. 1299-1303). Judge Maughan denied the motion to vacate, relying in part 
upon Judge Faust's June 13, 2008 Order and Judgment against D. Gilbert. Similar to 
Judge Faust's actions in entering his June 13, 2008 Order, Judge Maughan patently 
ignored D. Gilbert's most basic in personam and constitutional rights in ruling upon D. 
Gilbert's motion to vacate. (R. 1187-90). It is from Judge Maughan's Minute Entry 
Order of January 14, 2011 denying D. Gilbert's motion to vacate and expunge Judge 
Faust's June 13, 2008 Order and Judgment and Judge Faust's June 13, 2008 Order to 
disgorge entered against D. Gilbert that this appeal is filed. (R. 1299-1303). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about January 31, 2007, Appellee UDSF filed and served this action. 
Named as defendants were Eric Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa 
Kingsbury, Kara Olander, and Mellanie Taylor. D. Gilbert was never named or served as 
a defendant in this action. (R. 1-11). 
2- The named defendants initially were represented by Graham H. Norris, Jr., 
who filed and served an answer on behalf of the defendants on or about March 6, 2007. 
(R. 12-18). 
7 
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3. Subsequently, on or about March 29, 2007, UDSF moved for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief against the named defendants, but not against 
D. Gilbert, who was neither a party nor counsel to any party in this case. (R. 25-47). 
4. Graham H. Norris, Jr., who was then counsel for the defendants, failed to 
timely file and serve properly an opposition to the Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 48-
49). On or about May 3, 2007, Partial Summary Judgment and Injunctive Relief was 
entered by a default order (hereinafter referred to as the "Default Order") against the 
named defendants, Eric Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa 
Kingsbury, Kara Olander and Mellanie Taylor by UDSF. (R. 51-54). 
5- It should be noted that D. Gilbert was not a defendant in the action at any 
time including when the March 10, 2008 Order was entered against him (R. 1187). The 
proposed Default Order was never presented to or served upon defense counsel of record, 
Graham H. Norris, Jr. (R. 51-54). Mr. Norris was never provided a copy of the Default 
Order required by Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by UDSF's counsel 
to approve the form and content of the proposed Default Order. (R. 51-54). There was 
no signature line on the Default Order where Mr. Norris was to sign the proposed order 
for his required approval. (R. 53). Nonetheless, counsel for UDSF presented to the 
district court the improper proposed Default Order, without the foregoing Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requirements, which was signed by Judge Maughan on April 30, 2007 
and entered on May 3, 2007. (R. 51-54). 
6. The relief granted by the Default Order is different than and more 
expansive than the relief requested in UDSF's Motion. (R. 51-54). Paragraph 2(a) of the 
8 
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Default Order prepared by UDSF's counsel and submitted to the district court for 
signature contains the words "Return all funds taken from or on deposit in Zion's 
Bank... and First American Credit Union." (R. 52). (Emphasis added). The words "or 
on deposit in" do not appear in the Motion. (R. 46). (Emphasis added). This particular 
phrase "or on deposit in" comes only from the Default Order and was never reviewed or 
approved by Norris as required by procedure. (R. 53). 
7. The District Court, either by mistake or in reliance on the errors and 
omissions contained in the proposed Default Order, entered by default, significant and 
expansive relief which was never raised in or requested in the motion. (R. 46). By 
adding the foregoing particular phrases, referenced in paragraph six above, UDSF's 
counsel made the Default Order contradict itself. The contradictions are contained in the 
Default Order's paragraphs 2(a) and 2(h). As paragraph 2(a) of the Default Order reads, 
the individual defendants are to return all funds on deposit in the accounts, but paragraph 
2(h) of the Default Order then purports to restrain the same defendants from accessing 
those accounts, which access would be necessary for defendants to return the funds on 
deposit. (R. 52-53). 
8. On or about July, 2007, D. Gilbert then retained by UPTOWN DOWNS 
and UP WITH DOWNS, two Chapters of UDSF, moved to intervene in the action as 
legal counsel only in an attempt to correct the record and rectify the clear improprieties of 
the Default Order filed ex parte in this action. (R. 78-92). Judge Maughan granted the 
motion for intervention. (R. 752-756). However, after multiple motions were filed but 
before they could be heard, the case was thereafter administratively reassigned to Judge 
9 
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Faust, who was not presiding when the Default Order was entered by Judge Maughan. 
(R. 871). No correction to this improperly prepared and ex parte filed Default Order was 
ever made. {See Court's Docket, R. 878-881; 899-901). 
9, Before the reassignment of the case, on or about September 21, 2007, 
UDSF filed and served a "Motion for Entry of Judgment and For Order to Show Cause" 
seeking an order requiring the named defendants to repay, among other things, the legal 
fees that had been paid to D. Gilbert from the named Chapter defendants' accounts for 
services rendered. (R. 150-196). As well as to require D. Gilbert to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt for not releasing funds held in his attorney trust account. 
{See UDSF's Motion for Entry of Judgment and For Order to Show Cause filed 
September 21, 2007, R. 150-196). 
10. On or about November 1, 2007, after multiple delays by UDSF, but before 
UDSF's Motion for Entry of Judgment and For Order to Show Cause could be heard or 
decided, it then filed a "Motion for Disgorgement of Funds" requesting the district court 
order D. Gilbert, who was not a party to the action, to disgorge the funds he had received 
from his clients, UDSF chapters UP WITH DOWNS and UPTOWN DOWNS, which 
were the self-same funds UDSF had asked the individual defendants be required to 
"repay" to UDSF in its Motion for Entry of Judgment and for Order to Show Cause. The 
apparent grounds these Chapters were only fictitious business names of UDSF and the 
funds used by the Chapters to pay fees to D. Gilbert actually belonged to UDSF and not 
to the Chapters represented by D. Gilbert. (R. 150-196). {See also proof of Chapter 
independence/autonomy copies, R. 349-370; 1243-45). 
10 
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11. Historically, the UDSF Chapters had always raised their own funds and 
paid their own expenditures, which include attorney fees. (R. 336-370). UDSF admits 
these facts in its original complaint and several other pleadings. (See R. 1-11). Rule 
17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that unincorporated associations, 
such as UP WITH DOWNS and UPTOWN DOWNS can sue and be sued. Rule 17(d) 
contemplates persons in unincorporated associations transact business. Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). Utah law allows for unincorporated 
associations to transact business in the State of Utah. Id. 
12. D. Gilbert, who was not a party to the action, never personally responded to 
UDSF's Motion for Disgorgement of Funds, but only briefed and argued the issue in 
behalf of his clients, UP WITH DOWNS and UPTOWN DOWNS, the Chapter 
Interveners in the action. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Disgorgement 
of Funds, R. 872-877). 
13. In the Minute Entry issued by the district court on March 11, 2008 (R. 907-
-911), the district court granted UDSF "[a]ny remaining issues regarding the 
disgorgement of funds" and at the same time entered a judgment against the seven (7) 
individual defendants for the self-same funds creating what might be construed as a 
double recovery for UDSF. Additionally, the Minute Entry states that it will stand as the 
order of the court. (R. 909). 
14. In open court on March 10, 2008, Judge Faust stated that if D. Gilbert did 
not disgorge the funds, then the individual defendants would have to pay over the funds 
to the UDSF. (See Transcript of March 10, 2008, pp.s 85-87, R. 1336). 
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15. Pursuant to the Court's March 11, 2008 Minute Entry, without any 
direction to do so and in spite of the fact the Minute Entry states that it will be the order 
of the district court, UDSPs counsel prepared and submitted an order and judgment 
without any opportunity for D. Gilbert to review or oppose it required under Rule 7(f)(2), 
Utah R. Civ. P., and the District Court proceeded without in personam jurisdiction to 
enter a money judgment against D. Gilbert. {See Judgment, R. 1078-81). 
16. D. Gilbert withdrew as counsel for the individual defendants and Uptown 
and Up on April 14, 2008. (R. 920-921). 
17. D. Gilbert then filed a motion to vacate, expunge or other relief from the 
district court on November 29, 2010 setting aside any money judgment(s) against him as 
void for lack of jurisdiction. (R. 1187-1284). 
18. When D. Gilbert disgorged the $11,000.43 of remaining funds he held in 
trust, UDSF thought he should have returned a more significant amount, and a complaint 
was filed with the Utah State Bar against D. Gilbert by Suzanne Smith, who was then 
claiming to be UDSF's "president." (R. 1193). An action precipitated by Suzanne Smith 
is now proceeding in the Fourth Judicial District by the Utah State Bar (the "OPC 
case")as a result of her bar complaint. D. Gilbert's professional standing and right to 
practice law are now unjustly at stake as a result of this matter. The OPC case is now 
upon interlocutory appeal by third-party defendant UDSF, is pending in this Court and 
styled In the Matter of the Discipline of Donald D. D. Gilbert, Jr., v. Utah Down 
Syndrome Foundation, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 20110004-SC. 
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19. On January 14, 2011 a final order was entered as a minute entry by the 
Honorable Judge Paul G. Maughan, reaffirming the June 13, 2008 Order and Judgment of 
Disgorgement of Attorney Fees entered by the Honorable Judge Robert Faust against D. 
Gilbert and denying D. Gilbert's Motion to Vacate and Expunge or Set Aside an Order 
and Judgment entered against him by Judge Faust's Minute Entry Order. The June 13, 
2008 and January 14, 2011 Orders and Minute Entry were entered in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 1078-81; 1299-1303). Both Orders are the subject of 
this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
D. Gilbert is an active member of the Utah State Bar and practicing attorney in the 
courts of the State of Utah. The issues raised in this appeal are central to and underly 
critical facts and procedural and constitutional rights that may and will impact D. 
Gilbert's future status as to his ability to continue to enjoy the privileges and rights 
afforded him by this Court and the State of Utah to continue to practice law, his life's 
chosen profession. Based on the career continuation issues facing D. Gilbert in this and 
the companion appeal (referenced on p. 1 in this opening brief) before this Court are two 
of the most fundamental principles of law that are at the center of this appeal: 
First, that a person may not be deprived of his property without first being 
afforded due process of law. 
No principle is more fundamental to the integrity of a society that claims 
allegiance to the rule of law than the principle that a person may not be 
deprived of his property without first being afforded due process of law. 
This guarantee is enshrined in both the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Utah. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
That due process of law is owed in every instance is a self-evident 
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proposition. Measuring the amount of process that is due in any particular 
setting is more difficult. Nevertheless, "[w]e long ago succinctly 
summarized the fundamental features of due process, observing that it 
requires that notice be given to the person whose rights are to be affected. It 
hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial." Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 
40, f 8, 94 P.3d 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). The bare essentials 
of due process thus mandate adequate notice to those with an interest in the 
matter and an opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner. See 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1j 68, 100 P.3d 1177. 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2007 UT 17 at % 28, 156 P.3d 782. 
Second, a money judgment may not, under most circumstances, be entered 
against a person who has not been named a party to an action and served process. 
In most instances, the guarantee of due process prohibits the enforcement of 
a money judgment against a person who has not been designated a party or 
served with process. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 
S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996). Absent due process, a court wields no 
power over an individual because a court only acquires jurisdiction over a 
party through proper service of process, which provides notice to the 
defendant that he is being sued and that he must appear and defend himself. 
Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981). 
Ttf.atf 31. 
Under the compelling facts and circumstances of this case and the mandatory 
application of the foregoing two most critical doctrines in our legal system raised in this 
appeal, the orders of the District Court appealed to this Court and entered against D. 
Gilbert should be reversed, vacated and expunged. Only then, can it be respectfully said 
here that justice has been properly meted out in this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS COMMITTED PLAIN REVERSABLE ERROR BY 
ENTERING ORDERS AGAINST D. GILBERT THAT WERE VOID AS A 
MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE COURTS LACKED IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION OVER D. GILBERT FOR THE FAILURE TO SERVE D. 
GILBERT WITH FORMAL PROCESS. 
A. Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Entitles D. Gilbert Relief 
From the District Court Orders and Judgments Where They are Void for 
Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction. 
On November 29, 2010 D. Gilbert filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate, expunge or for other relief seeking to set aside the 
March 10, 2008 Order of Disgorgement of Fees based on the ground the District Courts 
lacked in personam jurisdiction. 
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:. . (4) the judgment is void; 
. . . . A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
When a motion is based on subpart (4) of Rule 60(b) for lack of jurisdiction, the 
district court has no discretion and if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand 
without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. See Franklin Covey Client 
Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT. App. 110, 8; 2 P.3d 451. 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, when a motion to 
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vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district 
court has no discretion; if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand 
without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, 
the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the 
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not 
defer to the district court. 
Id. At 454 {citing State Dep't o/Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
D. Gilbert has brought this motion under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because he was never made a party to the action, was never served with any 
summons and complaint and was never afforded the rights to defend himself which 
defendants in civil actions are to be afforded. This court denied his due process rights by 
entering a money judgment against him without jurisdiction to enter any judgment 
against him. 
B. UDSF's Motions for Disgorgement of Funds Filed Against D. Gilbert and the 
District Courts' Orders of June 13, 2008 and January 14, 2011 Entered 
Against D. Gilbert are Prima Facie Void Because D. Gilbert was Never 
Served Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
From the commencement of this case to the time of filing this appeal, D. Gilbert 
has never been served a summons and complaint in this case. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure governs service of process. Jackson Constr. Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 2004 UT. 
89; 100P.3d 1211,1214. 
For a court to acquire jurisdiction, there must be a proper issuance and 
service of summons. Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 197 
(1971). This requirement ensures that an individual will not be deprived of 
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. "An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
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opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950); see also Carlson v. Bos, 
740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987) ("Service of process implements the 
procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed of 
pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to defend against 
the action."). 
Id. at 1214. "Service of process implements the procedural due process requirement that 
a defendant be informed of pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to 
defend against the action." Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). 
"Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction." Murdoch v. Blake, 484 P.2d 
164, 167 (Utah 1971). "The proper issuance and service of summons is the means of 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant; 
these cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone or any other such means." 
Id. 
"Personal jurisdiction . . . is the court's ability to exercise its power over a person 
for the purposes of adjudicating his or her rights and liabilities. A lack of [personal 
jurisdiction] is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to a particular 
litigant." State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure owe their existence to the constitutional 
guarantee of due process of law. They "[are] designed to provide a pattern of regularity 
of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon." Gillett v. 
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Price, 2006 UT 24, f^ 8, 135 P.3d 861 (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In most instances, the guarantee of due process prohibits the enforcement of a 
money judgment against a person who has not been designated a party or served with 
process. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (1996). 
Absent due process, a court wields no power over an individual because a court only 
acquires jurisdiction over a party through proper service of process, which provides 
notice to the defendant that he is being sued and that he must appear and defend himself. 
Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURTS' ENTRY OF THEIR JUNE 2008 ORDER OF 
DISGORGEMENT AND JANUARY 2011 ORDER DENYING D. GILBERT'S 
RULE 60(b)(4) MOTION TO VACATE, VIOLATED D. GILBERT'S UTAH AND 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND ARE 
VOID FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION. 
The original complaint was filed in this case and did not name D. Gilbert as a 
party nor did it seek a legal or equitable remedy of disgorgement of funds from any of the 
named defendants. (R. 1-11). At no time throughout the entire proceedings was an 
amended complaint ever filed naming D. Gilbert as a party defendant. (R. 1187-1284). 
Without the requisite personal service of process upon D. Gilbert in this action, the two 
orders against D. Gilbert by the district court are invalid. (R. 1187-1284). 
In support of the motion, the nonparties demonstrated without contradiction 
that they had not been named as defendants in the action, had not been 
served with process notifying them of any claim for money damages 
against them, and had not been afforded the opportunity to defend such 
claim. A court has no power to grant relief against an individual or entity 
not named as a party and not properly summed before the court 
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"In challenge to service of process, the fact that a defendant has 
received prompt notice of the action is of no moment. Notice received 
by means other than those authorized by statute does not bring a 
defendant within the jurisdiction of the court." (Macchia v. Russo, 67 
N.Y.2d 592, 595, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591, 496 N.E.2d 680.) 
Hartloff v. Hartloff, 296 A.D.2d 849, 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
D. Gilbert entered his appearance in this case as substitute counsel for the 
individually named defendants on September 26, 2007. (R. 280-281). He did so with the 
goal and scope of setting aside the District Courts' May 3, 2007 Order entered against the 
defendants. (R. 197-279). D. Gilbert filed a comprehensive combined motion and 
supporting legal memorandum to support his motion for the defendants. (R. 197-279). 
On December 21, 2007 UDSF filed a motion for disgorgement of $22,500.00 
against D. Gilbert. He had been paid these sums by the defendants for the rendering of 
his legal services from the UDSF Chapter accounts after the May 3, 2007 District Court 
Order was entered. (R. 876). At the time of the filing of this motion to disgorge, again 
D. Gilbert was not a named party in the case and had not been served with proper 
process. (R. 873). The Interveners opposed the motion to disgorge by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion on behalf of the defendants and Interveners. 
(R. 872-877). 
An extensive oral argument was conducted before the Court on March 10, 2008, 
the Honorable Judge Robert Faust presiding, regarding UDSF's motion to disgorge 
together with certain other motions. (R. 1336). 
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On March 11, 2008 the District Court, the Honorable Judge Faust presiding made 
a Minute Entry in the case granting UDSF's motion for entry of judgment and motion for 
disgorgement of $22,500.00 against D. Gilbert individually. (R. 907-910). 
On April 14, 2008 D. Gilbert withdrew as counsel of record. (R. 920-921). 
On May 12, 2008, after D. Gilbert was no longer counsel of record for the 
defendants, UDSF filed a second motion for disgorgement of funds against D. Gilbert 
requesting he be ordered to disgorge an additional $7,500.00 he was paid by the UDSF 
Chapters, after the entry of the Court's May 3, 2007 Order. (R. 956-965). This motion 
did not raise any claims of or for sanctions or contempt against D. Gilbert. (R. 956-965). 
At the time of the filing of this second motion to disgorge, D. Gilbert was not a party to 
the action. 
Diligent research has revealed no Utah case authority to allow a district court to 
disregard the constitutional underpinnings of in personam jurisdiction and sua sponte 
enter a money judgment against a non-party. Only when a lawyer acting as an officer of 
the court either in a judicial proceeding in the presence of the court or in some instances 
is engaging in contemptuous conduct outside the court's presence, may a court invoke its 
inherent contempt powers against an attorney or a party thereby circumventing the 
requirements of in personam jurisdiction. However, even when a court exercises its 
contempt powers, the court's inherent powers of contempt authority may be limited or 
restricted by due process protections. 
A court's authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and 
inherent. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-32-1 to -17 (2002) (detailing the 
procedures governing contempt); In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, 224 
(1913) ("It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior 
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jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. 
Among these are the power to punish for contempt....").. . . Rather, "to the 
extent the common law [governing contempt] [is] not inconsistent with the 
statutes, it survives and can continue to evolve." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 
P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1988); see also People ex rel Pierce v. Carrington, 
5 Utah 531, 17 P. 735, 737 (1888) ("[CJourts may go beyond the power 
given by statute in order to preserve and enforce constitutional powers 
when acts in contempt invade them."). This inherent authority, however, is 
not without limitation. A court's authority to "hold any person in contempt, 
whether a party to a case before that court or a non-party, is subject to 
constitutional and statutory restraints regarding the process due to any 
person so accused." Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, % 25, 20 
P.3d307. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the demands of due 
process may limit a court's authority to sanction contemptuous conduct. In 
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897), the Court 
held that the act of striking a defendant's answer simply because he failed 
to comply with the court's order to pay a certain sum into the court's 
registry violated "an essential element of due process of law." Id. at 444, 17 
S.Ct. 841. In contrast, in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 
322, 29 S.Ct. 370, 53 L.Ed. 530 (1909), the Court concluded that the 
district court did not violate due process when it struck the defendant's 
answer after the defendant refused to comply with the court's discovery 
order. Id. at 351, 29 S.Ct. 370. In distinguishing Hovey, the Hammond 
Court declared that "the preservation of due process was secured by the 
presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the 
administration of due process was but an admission of the want of merit in 
the asserted defense." Id. 
Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416, 427-28 (Utah 2005). 
There is also no authority granted to a court to enter a money judgment against a 
person or even an officer of the court, here D. Gilbert, simply because he happens to be in 
the court at the time. 
Although D. Gilbert had clearly been aware of the issues and claims asserted by 
UDSF at the time he entered his appearance as counsel in this case, he had never been 
served with process, or placed on proper notice that he was the subject of any actual or 
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potential personal judgments to be entered against him by the district court; or 
constitutionally allowed to defend his interests in the manner afforded a defendant in a 
civil action. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 1128; 
110 P.3d 678 (addressing due process concerns when a party sought to be issue precluded 
is not an actual party to the case). 
[D]ue process concerns are present," however, "when the party sought to be 
precluded was not an actual party in the first lawsuit." Tyus, 93 F.3d at 454. 
Those concerns exist in part "[b]ecause preclusion based on privity is an 
exception to the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have 
his own day in court,' " id. (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 
793, 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996)), and because of the 
"general consensus in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound 
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process," 
Richards, 517 U.S. at 798, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (internal quotations omitted). 
Therefore, "courts must ensure that the relationship between the party to the 
original suit and the party sought to be precluded in the later suit is 
sufficiently close to justify preclusion." Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 
454 (8th Cir. 1996). "'[T]he due process clauses prevent preclusion when 
the relationship between the party and non-party becomes too attenuated.'" 
Id. (quoting Southwest Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 
95 (5th Cir. 1977)). In addition, "we resolve all doubts in favor of 
permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy." 
Baxter v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1985). 
Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT at f 28. 
CONCLUSION 
D. Gilbert throughout the proceedings in the District Courts was and now is 
entitled to due process of law, as is any other person pursuant to the 14th amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, which is binding upon the courts of this State. He is similarly 
entitled to the same constitutional protections under the Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 
[Due Process of Law], In personam jurisdiction is an important part of the due process to 
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which D. Gilbert is constitutionally entitled. The District Court had no in personam 
jurisdiction to enter a money judgment against him at any time in the June 2008 Order 
and Judgment of Disgorgement of Funds and the January 2011 Order Denying D. 
Gilbert's Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate must be reversed as void for lack of in 
personam jurisdiction. 
DATED this 16th day of August 2011. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
E. Barney Qesas/of Counsel 
Andersen & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2035 
Telephone: 801 534-1700 
Facsimile: 801 364-7697 
Lynn O. Poulson 
Johnson, Poulson & Coons, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Judgment Debtor and 
Appellant Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
Order and Judgment, June 13, 2008, R. 1078-1081. 
Minute Entry, January 11, 2011, R. 1299-1303. 
Notice of Appeal of Donald D. Gilbert, Jr., February 11,2011, R. 1307-1311. 
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IN AND f ^ T H B THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME 
FOUNDATION, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UtAHEOWN SYNDROME 
ASSOCIATION, H!IC HOLMAN, 
CATHY COLLARD, PAM HOLMAN, 
JILL AUSTIN, LISA KINGSBURY, 
KARA OLANDER, end 
MELLANIB TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
(DONALD GILBERT) 
OVILNO. 070902087 
JUDGE: Faost 
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Disgorgement of Funds binong come before the Court and 
fiiettf beingno timely opposition thereto and good cause appearing^ is hereby ordered, decreed and 
adjudged 89 follows. 
1. Plaintiffs Second Motion for Disgoigeraent of Funds is granted. 
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in the anoant of $2,453.00. 
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as shell be established by affidavit 
Dated (bis _B|kday of June, 2008. 
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cfo Novell Law Depsrtmeoi 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME FOUNDATION, : MINUTE ENTRY 
INC., 
: CASE NO. 070902087 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME ASSOCIATION, 
ERIC HOLMAN, CATHY COLLARD, PAM : 
HOLMAN, JILL AUSTIN, LISA 
KINGSBURY, KARA OLANDER, and : 
MELLANIE TAYLOR, 
t 
Defendants• 
THE MEMBERS OF THE UPTOWN DOWNS AND 
UP WITH DOWNS, the Salt Lake and : 
Utah County Chapters of the Utah 
Down Syndrome Foundation, : 
Interveners. : 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with the 
plaintiff's request for decision on Donald D. Gilbert, Jr.'s Motion to 
Vacate, Expunge or Set Aside an Order and Judgment Against Him. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding Memoranda, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
Mr. Gilbert is an attorney who represented certain intervening 
parties in this action. Prior to Mr. Gilbert's representation, the Court 
entered an Order granting the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment and Injunctive Relief with respect to the individual defendants 
in this matter. The Order, dated May 3, 2007, required the individual 
defendants to return various funds, including to w[r]eturn all funds 
taken from or on deposit in Zions Bank. . * ." 
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment and 
for Order to Show Cause pertaining to the individual defendants' failure 
to repay the funds which were the subject of the May 3rd Order. In that 
Motion, the plaintiff also sought to recoup funds which were paid- to Mr. 
Gilbert as attorney's fees rather than returned to the plaintiff as 
contemplated in the May 3 rd Order. The plaintiff subsequently filed 
formal Motions for Disgorgement of Funds, again seeking to recoup funds 
paid to Mr. Gilbert as fees. 
On March 10, 2008, Judge Faust, who was previously assigned to this 
matter, considered the plaintiff's dual Motions. In a Minute Entry 
decision which followed, Judge Faust granted the plaintiff's Motions, 
including ordering disgorgement of funds paid to Mr. Gilbert. An Order, 
dated June 13, 2008, awarded Judgment to the plaintiff against Mr. 
Gilbert for funds he had received and included an award of attorney's 
fees against Mr. Gilbert directly. 
Over two years after the entry of Judge Faust's Order, Mr. Gilbert 
has brought the presently pending Motion to vacate the Order on the 
grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Judgment against him. 
The plaintiff maintains that this Motion is untimely and that the Court 
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did have jurisdiction because Mr. Gilbert, as an attorney, is an officer 
of the court. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
determines that .Judge Faust had jurisdiction to enter Judgment against 
Mr. Gilbert because of his receipt of monies that were the subject of a 
Court Order requiring those funds to be returned to the plaintiff. The 
fact that Mr. Gilbert was not a party to this action is irrelevant. He 
is an attorney representing parties in this action and was clearly aware 
of the Court Order which was in place when he commenced representation. 
While the funds at issue were not formally frozen, they were clearly 
identified and earmarked for return to the plaintiff. Mr. Gilbert had 
a clear duty to ensure that the funds he was receiving for attorney's 
fees did not come from these pool of funds, a duty which he violated. 
Indeed, it appears that Mr. Gilbert was fully aware of the source for his 
payments, but nevertheless accepted these funds. Under such 
circumstances, both Mr. Gilbert and the funds he received fell under this 
Court's continuing jurisdiction. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that disgorgement of 
Mr. Gilbert's fees and the award of attorney's fees against him were 
appropriate measures, particularly given his notice of the Court'.s Order 
and the role he played in this action. Accordingly, Mr. Gilbert's 
Motion to Vacate, Expunge or Set Aside an Order and Judgment Against Him 
is denied. 
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This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, no 
additional Order is required. 
Dated this /'? day of January, 2011. 
f A ^-VTrTK^^a-fit, " -^  ' 
^ y ^ — ^ x g^^jff^>>>g:^^^^^^^^yg'^— 
I>-?VXJXJ G. MAUGHAl| 1^%£fc^i jj 
DISTRICT COURT ^ff lSJ ' ^ S f e \ / 
STAMP USED A t ^ e t S f r p i s i ^ F JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this f'T day of January, 
2011: 
Russell A.'Cline 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lynn O. Poulson 
Attorney for Donald D. Gilbert, Jr, 
1435 East 2000 North 
Lehi, Utah 84043 . 
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rz v C O J 
E. Barney Gesas (#1179) 
O/Cowwe/ 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utali 84101-2035 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
ebgesas@aklawfirm.com 
Lynn O.Poulson (#9734) 
JOHNSON, POULSON AND COONS, 
A Professional Corporation 
1435 East 2000 North 
Lehi,Utah 84043 
Telephone: (801) 766-4000 
Facsimile: (801)766-0101 
poulson.lynn@,gmail.com 
Attorneys for Judgment Debtor and Appellant 
Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. 
FEB 1 \ 2011 
SALTLAKtCOUNi' 
«V_. — - — - " "Deputy uiei* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME FOUNDATION, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DOWN SYNDROME ASSOCIATION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
THE MEMBERS OF THE UPTOWN DOWNS 
AND UP WITH DOWN, the Salt Lake and Utah 
County Chapters of the Utah Down Syndrome 
Foundation, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF DONALD D. 
GILBERT, JR., JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
AND APPELLANT 
Civil No. 070902087 
Judge Paul G. Maughan 
Intervenor. 
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Judgment Debtor and Appellant in this action, Mr. Donald D Gilbert, Jr. (Mr. Gilbert), 
based on a special appearance made by representation of legal counsel, Lynn 0. Poulson, hereby 
submits this Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rules 3(a), (d) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Mr. Gilbert was never a party to the action. Mr. Gilbert was an attorney of record in 
the matter for a period of time. From July 2007 to April 2008, Mr. Gilbert represented the 
Intervenors who presently appear to still be parties in the action. From September 2007 to April 
2008, Mr. Gilbert represented Eric Holman, Cathy Collard, Pam Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa 
Kingsbury, Kara Olander and Mellanie Taylor who now appear to be dismissed parties, Mr. 
Gilbert is former legal counsel of certain intervenors in the above-entitled action (presently non-
dismissed as parties in this case), and for a relatively short time represented by Mr. Gilbert, 
otherwise now dismissed parties. However, Mr. Gilbert was never a party to the action. 
Mr. Gilbert's appeal now is made based on a January 14, 2011, Minute Entry by the 
Honorable Paul G. Maughan, entered as an Order against Mr. Gilbert (the "Minute Entry Order") 
denying his motion to expunge or set aside, for lack of jurisdiction, an "Order and Judgment" 
against him signed by the previously assigned judge, the Honorable Robert Faust, on Junel3, 
2008 and entered in the Registry of Judgments June 17, 2008 (the "Judge Faust Order). The 
Judge Faust Order states that it is based on a Second Motion for Disgorgement of Funds. 
In the Minute Entry Order, the reassigned judge in this case, makes a finding that the trial 
court had "continuing jurisdiction" over Mr. Gilbert to enter the Minute Entry Order and 
reaffirms the Judge Faust Order, which includes an award of attorney fees against Mr. Gilbert. 
The Judge Faust Order awarded judgment to the plaintiff, Utah Down Syndrome Foundation 
directly against the appellant, Mr, Gilbert, for legal fees he had received from his intervenor 
clients while representing them in this matter. 
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When the Judge Faust Order was entered against Mr. Gilbert, he was then a non-party to 
the case, and no longer counsel of record for any of the parties in the case. The Court in both 
the Judge Faust Order and the Minute Entry Order make serious and adverse rulings impacting 
Mr. Gilbert's statutory, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutional procedural and substantive 
rights, defenses and claims. Accordingly, by operation of both law and equity, Mr. Gilbert has 
legal standing to preserve all of his legal rights, including but not limited to, the filing of this 
Notice of Appeal. 
It is the Minute Entry Order appealed here by Mr. Gilbert, the Judgment Debtor, 
finding that Mr, Gilbert was subject to in personam jurisdiction, based upon the Judge 
Faust Order is appealed. The Minute Entry Order was made and entered in this case in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Utah Down Syndrome 
Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Association, et aL, Civil Case No. 070902087. The 
Minute Entry Order, appealed here, adopted and reaffirmed the Judge Faust Order. 
Note: On June 1, 2009, a Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement and Stay 
this Case was filed by the defendants, including several of the defendants now dismissed 
from these proceedings, including Utah Downs Syndrome Association, Eric Holman, Cathy 
Collard, Pam Holman, Jill Austin, Lisa Kingsbury, Kara Olander and Mellanie Taylor 
based upon an executed approved settlement agreement and stay proceedings. The motion 
was approved and entered as an Order Approving the Settlement Agreement and Staying 
these proceedings was entered on June 3, 2009 in this case by the Honorable Judge Robert 
Faust (the "Stay Order"). {See this case's June 3, 2009 docket entry). Since June 3, 2009, 
the Stay Order has not been set aside, modified or otherwise vacated. 
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It is not clear whether the Minute Entry Order from which this appeal is filed, is a 
proper, valid or final order that can be procedurally appealed at this time or whether the 
Stay Order was otherwise altered, modified or vacated either expressly, by implication or 
operation of law because of the Minute Entry Order. Accordingly, this appeal is filed as a 
protective, prophylactic measure and procedural action to fully protect, preserve and 
reserve all procedural, legal and appellate rights in these proceedings of the Judgment 
Debtor and Appellant, Mr. Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. 
/ / ^ 
DATED this ' / day of February 2011. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG. 
E. Barney Gesas, ofCojinsel 
Lynn.O. Poulson 
JOHNSON, POULSON AND COONS, 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Judgment Debtor and Appellant 
Donald D. Gilbert, Jr. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February // 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL OF DONALD D. GILBERT, JR., JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
AND APPELLANT to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, LC 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
zi^YLr > 
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